Strategic Disclosure of Intermediate Research Results
AbstractWe analyze the incentives to disclose intermediate research results. We find that despite the help that disclosure can give to a rival, the leading innovator sometimes chooses to disclose. Disclosure signals commitment to the research project, which may induce a rival to exit. With weak product market competition, the leader discloses intermediate results that are sufficiently promising, while secrecy may be employed for very good results. As spillovers from disclosure increase, the leader becomes more secretive. With strong product market competition, the leader may rely entirely on secrecy but perhaps surprisingly invests more often at the intermediate stage.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 211.
Date of creation: 01 Dec 2004
Date of revision:
Disclosure; Intermediate Research Results; Spillovers; R&D;
Other versions of this item:
- David Gill, 2008. "Strategic Disclosure of Intermediate Research Results," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(3), pages 733-758, 09.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L19 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Other
- O32 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
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