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Dynamic R&D Competition

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  • Gene M. Grossman
  • Carl Shapiro

Abstract

We study a simple, two-stage, stochastic patent race involving two firms. We examine the behavior of the participants as they gain the lead or fall behind in the race. We find that the leader engages in R&D more intensively than does the follower, and that both firms intensify their efforts if the follower does catch up with the leader. We also analyze (1) the attractiveness of licensing, whereby the leader shares his results with the follower,(2) a policy of issuing patents for intermediate research results, and (3) the effects of research joint ventures, whereby the firms coordinate their initial research efforts and share their results.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 1674.

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Date of creation: Mar 1988
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:1674

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References

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  1. Kenneth L. Judd, 2003. "Closed-loop equilibrium in a multi-stage innovation race," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 673-695, 03.
  2. Fudenberg, Drew & Gilbert, Richard & Stiglitz, Joseph & Tirole, Jean, 1983. "Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 3-31, June.
  3. Harris, Christopher & Vickers, John, 1985. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a Race," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 193-209, April.
  4. Reinganum, Jennifer F., 1981. "Dynamic games of innovation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 21-41, August.
  5. Lee, Tom & Wilde, Louis L, 1980. "Market Structure and Innovation: A Reformulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 94(2), pages 429-36, March.
  6. Shapiro, Carl, 1985. "Patent Licensing and R&D Rivalry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 25-30, May.
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Cited by:
  1. Chaim Fershtman & Morton I. Kamien, 1990. "Cross Licensing of Complementary Technologies," Discussion Papers 866, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Jay Pil Choi, 1999. "A Dynamic Analysis of Licensing: The "Boomerang" Effect and Grant-Back Clauses," Working Paper Series no16, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University.
  3. Cozzi, Guido & Galli, Silvia, 2011. "Upstream innovation protection: common law evolution and the dynamics of wage inequality," MPRA Paper 31902, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. David Gill, 2004. "Strategic Disclosure of Intermediate Research Results," Economics Series Working Papers 211, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  5. Zschocke, Mark S. & Mantin, Benny & Jewkes, Elizabeth M., 2013. "Mature or emerging markets: Competitive duopoly investment decisions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 228(3), pages 612-622.
  6. Daron Acemoglu, 2007. "Equilibrium Bias of Technology," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(5), pages 1371-1409, 09.
  7. Leandro Arozamena & Estelle Cantillon, 2000. "Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1276, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  8. Michael Peneder & Martin Wörter, 2013. "Competition, R&D and Innovation: Testing the Inverted-U in a Simultaneous System," WIFO Working Papers 448, WIFO.
  9. Alexandre Gaudeul, 2004. "Open Source Software Development Patterns and License Terms," Industrial Organization 0409008, EconWPA.
  10. Cozzi, Guido & Galli, Silvia, 2011. "Privatization of Knowledge: Did the U.S. Get It Right? (New Version)," MPRA Paper 29710, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Alka Chadha & Åke Blomqvist, 2005. "Patent Races, “Me-Too” Drugs, and Generics: A Developing-World Perspective," Departmental Working Papers wp0513, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics.
  12. Nguyen, Thang, 2004. "Technological Progress in Races for Product Supremacy," MPRA Paper 235, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 18 Jul 2006.
  13. Tucci, Christopher L. (Christopher Luigi) & Cusumano, Michael A., 1954-, 1994. "Benefits and pitfalls of international strategic technology alliances," Working papers 3706-94. WP (Internationa, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  14. Aikaterini Kokkinou, 2005. "Entrepreneurship, Innovation Activities and Regional Growth," ERSA conference papers ersa05p419, European Regional Science Association.

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