Competitive Altruism and Endogenous Reference Group Selection in Private Provision of Environmental Public Goods
AbstractWe develop and test a model of social comparison in which individuals gain status through pro-social behavior (competitive altruism) and in which they endogenously choose the reference group and associated reference standard involved in signaling status (reference group selection). In our framework of private provision of environmental public goods, the optimal reference standard involves a balance between the magnitude of the status signal (implying a low reference standard) and the higher value of the signal in a greener social environment. By using a unique set of survey data we find evidence of (a) respondents behaving in a competitively altruistic fashion and (b) reference persons’ intensity of pro-environmental behavior depending on relevant attitudes of the respondents, consistent with predictions from our framework of reference group selection.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number V-350-12.
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2012
Date of revision: Oct 2012
Publication status: Published in Oldenburg Working Papers V-350-12
competitive altruism; reference groups; endogenous reference standard; pro-environmental behavior; private public good provision;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
- H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- Q00 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - General - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-06-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2013-06-09 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2013-06-09 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2013-06-09 (Evolutionary Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Falk, Armin & Knell, Markus, 2004.
"Choosing the Joneses: Endogenous Goals and Reference Standards,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4459, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Armin Falk & Markus Knell, 2004. "Choosing the Joneses: Endogenous Goals and Reference Standards," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(3), pages 417-435, October.
- Falk, Armin & Knell, Markus, 2004. "Choosing the Joneses: Endogenous Goals and Reference Standards," IZA Discussion Papers 1152, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Glazer, Amihai & Konrad, Kai A, 1996. "A Signaling Explanation for Charity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 1019-28, September.
- Frank, Robert H, 1985. "The Demand for Unobservable and Other Nonpositional Goods," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 101-16, March.
- Davidson, Russell & MacKinnon, James G., 1993. "Estimation and Inference in Econometrics," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195060119.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Catharina Schramm).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.