Price Discrimination in Two-Sided Markets
AbstractWe examine the profitability and the welfare implications of price discrimination in two-sided markets. Platforms have information about the preferences of the agents that allows them to price discriminate within each group. The conventional wisdom from one-sided horizontally differentiated markets is that price discrimination hurts the firms and benefits consumers, prisoners' dilemma. Moreover, it is well-known that the presence of indirect externalities in two-sided markets can intensify the competition. Despite all these, we show that the possibility of price discrimination, in a two-sided market, may actually soften the competition. Therefore, the implications of price discrimination from one-sided markets may not carry over to two-sided markets. This is the case regardless of whether prices are public or private, although private prices boost profits. Our analysis also sheds light on the welfare properties of price discrimination in intermediate goods markets, such as Business-to-Business (B2B) markets.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by NET Institute in its series Working Papers with number 07-25.
Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2007
Date of revision: Sep 2007
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Web page: http://www.NETinst.org/
Price discrimination; Two-sided markets; Indirect network externalities; Market segmentation.;
Other versions of this item:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-10-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2007-10-27 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2007-10-27 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2007-10-27 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-MKT-2007-10-27 (Marketing)
- NEP-NET-2007-10-27 (Network Economics)
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- Charles Angelucci & Julia Cage & Romain de Nijs, 2013. "Price Discrimination in a Two-Sided Market: Theory and Evidence from the Newspaper Industry," Working Papers 13-13, NET Institute.
- Lapo Filistrucchi & Tobias J. Klein, 2013. "Price Competition in Two-Sided Markets with Heterogeneous Consumers and Network Effects," Working Papers 13-20, NET Institute.
- Reisinger, Markus, 2010. "Unique Equilibrium in Two-Part Tariff Competition between Two-Sided Platforms," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 308, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Hans Jarle Kind & Lars Sørgard, 2013. "Market Segmentation in Two-Sided Markets: TV Rights for Premier League," CESifo Working Paper Series 4060, CESifo Group Munich.
- Böhme, Enrico, 2012. "Second-Degree Price Discrimination on Two-Sided Markets," MPRA Paper 40951, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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