Second-Degree Price Discrimination on Two-Sided Markets
AbstractThe present paper provides a descriptive analysis of the second-degree price discrimination problem on a monopolistic two-sided market. By imposing a simple two-sided framework with two distinct types of agents on one of its market sides, it will be shown that under incomplete information, the extent of platform access for high-demand agents is strictly reduced below the benchmark level (complete information). In addition, the paper’s findings imply that it is feasible in the optimum to charge higher payments from low-demand agents if the extent of interaction with agents from the opposite market side is assumed to be bundle-specific.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 40951.
Date of creation: 30 Aug 2012
Date of revision:
two-sided markets; second-degree price discrimination; monopoly;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-09-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2012-09-09 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2012-09-09 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-NET-2012-09-09 (Network Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jean J. Gabszewicz & Didier Laussel & Nathalie Sonnac, 2004.
"Programming and Advertising Competition in the Broadcasting Industry,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(4), pages 657-669, December.
- GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & LAUSSEL, Didier & SONNAC, Nathalie, . "Programming and advertising competition in the broadcasting industry," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1873, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Peitz, Martin & Valletti, Tommaso, 2004.
"Content and Advertising in the Media: Pay-TV versus Free-To-Air,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4771, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Peitz, Martin & Valletti, Tommaso M., 2008. "Content and advertising in the media: Pay-tv versus free-to-air," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 949-965, July.
- Qihong Liu & Konstantinos Serfes, 2007. "Price Discrimination in Two-Sided Markets," Working Papers 07-25, NET Institute, revised Sep 2007.
- Esther Gal-Or & Anthony Dukes, 2003. "Minimum Differentiation in Commercial Media Markets," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(3), pages 291-325, 09.
- Spulber Daniel F., 1993. "Monopoly Pricing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 222-234, February.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.