Individual Precautions to Prevent Theft: Private Versus Socially OptimalBehavior
AbstractA model is examined in which individuals take precautions that reduce the amount stolen if thieves enter their homes; and the amount of theft is influenced by the level of individuals' precautions. It is emphasized that the motive of individuals acting alone to take precautions may include the diversion of theft to others but does not take into account general deterrence. For this and other reasons, the level of precautions exercised by individuals acting alone may differ from their collectively optimal level and also from the socially optimal level (which reflects effort devoted to theft).
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 3560.
Date of creation: Dec 1990
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Clotfelter, Charles T., 1978. "Private security and the public safety," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 388-402, July.
- Gary S. Becker, 1974.
"Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,"
in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alexander Muermann & Howard Kunreuther, 2007. "Self-Protection and Insurance with Interdependencies," NBER Working Papers 12827, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Nyberg, Sten, 1997.
"The honest society: Stability and policy considerations,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 83-99, April.
- Nyberg, Sten, 1992. "The Honest Society: Stability and Policy Considerations," Working Paper Series 341, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Ian Ayres & Steven D. Levitt, 1997.
"Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of Lojack,"
NBER Working Papers
5928, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ian Ayres & Steven D. Levitt, 1998. "Measuring Positive Externalities From Unobservable Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis Of Lojack," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(1), pages 43-77, February.
- Rafael Di Tella & Sebastian Galiani & Ernesto Schargrodsky, 2006. "Crime Distribution & Victim Behavior During a Crime Wave," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp849, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Rafael Di Tella & Sebastian Galiani & Ernesto Schargrodsky, 2006.
"Crime Distribution and Victim Behavior during a Crime Wave,"
CEDLAS, Working Papers
0044, CEDLAS, Universidad Nacional de La Plata.
- Rafael Di Tella & Sebastian Galiani & Ernesto Schargrodsky, 2010. "Crime Distribution and Victim Behavior during a Crime Wave," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of Crime: Lessons for and from Latin America, pages 175-204 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.