Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Smuggling, Camouflaging, and Market Structure

Contents:

Author Info

  • Richard A. Jensen
  • Jerry Thursby
  • Marie Thursby

Abstract

We examine how market structure and enforcement affect smuggling and welfare in a model where smuggling is camouflaged by legal sales. Conditions are given for when some, but not necessarily all, firms smuggle. With camouflaging, the market price is below the price when all sales are legal, so smuggling improves welfare if the price effect outweighs excess smuggling cost. This welfare effect is directly related to the degree of competition. Increased enforcement in this model potentially reduces welfare. The model is shown to be consistent with evidence on cigarette smuggling in the United States for 1975-1982.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w2630.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 2630.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Dec 1991
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:2630

Note: ITI IFM
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Phone: 617-868-3900
Email:
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Baltagi, Badi H & Levin, Dan, 1986. "Estimating Dynamic Demand for Cigarettes Using Panel Data: The Effects of Bootlegging, Taxation and Advertising Reconsidered," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 68(1), pages 148-55, February.
  2. repec:fth:michin:230 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Ethier, Wilfred J, 1986. "Illegal Immigration: The Host-Country Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 56-71, March.
  4. Sullivan, Daniel, 1985. "Testing Hypotheses about Firm Behavior in the Cigarette Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 586-98, June.
  5. Pitt, Mark M., 1981. "Smuggling and price disparity," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 447-458, November.
  6. Gene M. Grossman & Carl Shapiro, 1988. "Foreign Counterfeiting of Status Goods," NBER Working Papers 1915, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Appelbaum, Elie, 1982. "The estimation of the degree of oligopoly power," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2-3), pages 287-299, August.
  8. Sumner, Daniel A, 1981. "Measurement of Monopoly Behavior: An Application to the Cigarette Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 1010-19, October.
  9. Sheikh, Munir A., 1974. "Smuggling, production and welfare," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 355-364, November.
  10. Alan Deardorff & Wolfgang Stolper, 1990. "Effects of smuggling under african conditions: A factual, institutional and analytic discussion," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 116-141, March.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. de Melo, Jaime & Roland-Holst, David & Haddad, Mona, 1992. "Tax evasion and tax reform in a low income economy : general equilibrium estimates for Madagascar," Policy Research Working Paper Series 918, The World Bank.
  2. Kai A. Konrad & Tim Lohse & Salmai Qari, 2011. "Customs Compliance and the Power of Imagination," Working Papers customs_compliance_and_th, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  3. Garrett, Thomas A. & Marsh, Thomas L., 2002. "The revenue impacts of cross-border lottery shopping in the presence of spatial autocorrelation," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 501-519, July.
  4. Todd M. Nesbit, 2005. "The Revenue Impacts of Cross-border Sales and Tourism: Wine and Liquor Taxation," Working Papers 05-12 Classification-, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
  5. Ferrier, Peyton Michael, 2009. "The Economics of Agricultural and Wildlife Smuggling," Economic Research Report 55951, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
  6. Kazuki Onji, 2009. "A Tale of Pork Prices: Evasion and Attenuation of a Japanese Tariff," Asia Pacific Economic Papers 382, Australia-Japan Research Centre, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
  7. Ferrier, Peyton Michael, 2008. "Illicit Agricultural Trade," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 37(2), October.
  8. Farzanegan, Mohammad Reza, 2009. "Illegal trade in the Iranian economy: Evidence from a structural model," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 489-507, December.
  9. Marie C. Thursby & Jerry G. Thursby, 1994. "Interstate Cigarette Bootlegging: Extent, Revenue Losses, and Effects of Government Intervention," NBER Working Papers 4763, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Alamar, Benjamin Ph.D. & Mahmoud, Leila J.D. & Glantz, Stanton A. Ph.D., 2003. "Cigarette Smuggling in California: Fact and Fiction," University of California at San Francisco, Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education qt4fv0b2sz, Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education, UC San Francisco.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:2630

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.