IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/qjecon/v106y1991i3p789-814..html

Smuggling, Camouflaging, and Market Structure

Author

Listed:
  • Marie Thursby
  • Richard Jensen
  • Jerry Thursby

Abstract

We examine how market structure and enforcement affect smuggling and welfare in a model where smuggling is camouflaged by legal sales. Conditions are given for when some, but not necessarily all, firms smuggle. With camouflaging, the market price is below the price when all sales are legal, so smuggling improves welfare if the price effect outweighs excess smuggling cost. This welfare effect is directly related to the degree of competition. Increased enforcement in this model potentially reduces welfare. The model is shown to be consistent with evidence on cigarette smuggling in the United States for 1975–1982.

Suggested Citation

  • Marie Thursby & Richard Jensen & Jerry Thursby, 1991. "Smuggling, Camouflaging, and Market Structure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(3), pages 789-814.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:106:y:1991:i:3:p:789-814.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/2937927
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or

    for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:106:y:1991:i:3:p:789-814.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/qje .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.