IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/25815.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Politics of CEOs

Author

Listed:
  • Alma Cohen
  • Moshe Hazan
  • Roberto Tallarita
  • David Weiss

Abstract

CEOs of public companies have influence over the political spending of their firms, which has been attracting significant attention since the Supreme Court decision in Citizens United. Furthermore, the policy views expressed by CEOs receive substantial consideration from policymakers and the public. The political preferences of CEOs, we argue, are therefore important for a full understanding of U.S. policymaking and politics. To contribute to this understanding, we provide empirical evidence on the partisan leanings of public-company CEOs. We use Federal Election Commission (FEC) records to put together a comprehensive database of the political contributions made by over 3,500 individuals who served as CEOs of S&P 1500 companies during the period 2000-2017. We find that these political contributions display substantial partisan preferences in support of Republican candidates. We identify how this pattern is related to the company’s industry, geographical region, and CEO gender. To highlight the significance of CEO’s partisan preferences for some corporate decisions, we show that public companies led by Republican CEOs tend to be less transparent to investors with respect to their political spending. We conclude by discussing the potential policy implications of our analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Alma Cohen & Moshe Hazan & Roberto Tallarita & David Weiss, 2019. "The Politics of CEOs," NBER Working Papers 25815, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25815
    Note: CF LE POL
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w25815.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bonica Adam, 2016. "Avenues of influence: on the political expenditures of corporations and their directors and executives," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(4), pages 367-394, December.
    2. Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr, 2003. "Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 105-130, Winter.
    3. Grier, Kevin B & Munger, Michael C, 1991. "Committee Assignments, Constituent Preferences, and Campaign Contributions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(1), pages 24-43, January.
    4. Adams, Renée B. & Ferreira, Daniel, 2009. "Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 291-309, November.
    5. John Asker & Joan Farre-Mensa & Alexander Ljungqvist, 2015. "Corporate Investment and Stock Market Listing: A Puzzle?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 28(2), pages 342-390.
    6. Borghesi, Richard & Houston, Joel F. & Naranjo, Andy, 2014. "Corporate socially responsible investments: CEO altruism, reputation, and shareholder interests," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 164-181.
    7. Karty Kevin D., 2002. "Closure and Capture in Federal Advisory Committees," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(2), pages 1-27, August.
    8. Gwen Moore & Sarah Sobieraj & J. Allen Whitt & Olga Mayorova & Daniel Beaulieu, 2002. "Elite Interlocks in Three U.S. Sectors: Nonprofit, Corporate, and Government," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 83(3), pages 726-744, September.
    9. Bonica, Adam, 2016. "Avenues of influence: on the political expenditures of corporations and their directors and executives," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(4), pages 367-394, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hazan, Moshe & Cohen, Alma & Weiss, David, 2021. "Politics and Gender in the Executive Suite," CEPR Discussion Papers 14513, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Dhruv Chand Aggarwal, 2023. "The market for general counsel," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 20(4), pages 895-940, December.
    3. Fos, Vyacheslav & Kempf, Elisabeth & Tsoutsoura, Margarita, 2021. "The Political Polarization of Corporate America," Working Papers 313, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    4. Bhandari, Avishek & Golden, Joanna, 2021. "CEO political preference and credit ratings," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    5. Amin, Qazi Awais & Cumming, Douglas, 2023. "The politician as a CEO, corporate governance and firm value," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    6. Richard A. Benton & J. Adam Cobb & Timothy Werner, 2022. "Firm partisan positioning, polarization, and risk communication: Examining voluntary disclosures on COVID‐19," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(4), pages 697-723, April.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Woon Leong Lin, 2018. "Do Firm’s Organisational Slacks Influence the Relationship between Corporate Lobbying and Corporate Financial Performance? More Is Not Always Better," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 7(1), pages 1-23, December.
    2. Rockey, James & Zakir, Nadia, 2020. "When two tribes go to work: Board political diversity and firm performance," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    3. Jun†Koo Kang & Le Zhang, 2018. "Do Outside Directors with Government Experience Create Value?," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 47(2), pages 209-251, June.
    4. Aggey Semenov & Hector Perez Saiz, 2014. "The Effect Of Campaign Contributions On State Banking Regulation And Bank Expansion In U.S," 2014 Meeting Papers 1265, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    5. Zhang, Bobo & Zhang, Zhou, 2022. "Shining light on corporate political spending: Evidence from shareholder engagements," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    6. Ovtchinnikov, Alexei V. & Pantaleoni, Eva, 2012. "Individual political contributions and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 367-392.
    7. Greiner, Michael & Kim, Jaemin & Cordon Thor, Jennifer, 2023. "Narcissistic CEOs and their corporate political activity," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
    8. Ilona Babenko & Viktar Fedaseyeu & Song Zhang, 2017. "Do CEOs affect employees' political choices?," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1750, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    9. Ulrich Matter & Alois Stutzer, 2019. "Does Public Attention Reduce The Influence Of Moneyed Interests? Policy Positions On Sopa/Pipa Before And After The Internet Blackout," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 57(4), pages 1879-1895, October.
    10. Ding, Rong & Duan, Tinghua & Hou, Wenxuan & Liu, Xianda & Xu, Ziwei, 2022. "Do women drive corporate social responsibility? Evidence from gender diversity reforms around the world," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    11. Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira & Allan Drazen, 2018. "A Theory of Small Campaign Contributions," NBER Working Papers 24413, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2010. "Politician preferences, law-abiding lobbyists and caps on political contributions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(1), pages 81-101, October.
    13. Alma Cohen & Moshe Hazan & David Weiss, 2021. "Politics and Gender in the Executive Suite," NBER Working Papers 28893, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Michael Ensley, 2009. "Individual campaign contributions and candidate ideology," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 221-238, January.
    15. McGuinness, Paul B. & Vieito, João Paulo & Wang, Mingzhu, 2017. "The role of board gender and foreign ownership in the CSR performance of Chinese listed firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 75-99.
    16. Bombardini, Matilde & Trebbi, Francesco, 2011. "Votes or money? Theory and evidence from the US Congress," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7-8), pages 587-611, August.
    17. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi & Francesco Trebbi, 2010. "The Political Economy of the US Mortgage Default Crisis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 1967-1998, December.
    18. Jürgen Huber & Michael Kirchler, 2013. "Corporate campaign contributions and abnormal stock returns after presidential elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 285-307, July.
    19. Thomas Ferguson & Hans-Joachim Voth, 2008. "Betting on Hitler—The Value of Political Connections in Nazi Germany," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(1), pages 101-137.
    20. Silano, Filippo, 2023. "The political economy of finance and regulatory capture: Evidence from the US Congress," ILE Working Paper Series 72, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25815. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.