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Skill versus Voice in Local Development

Author

Listed:
  • Katherine Casey
  • Rachel Glennerster
  • Edward Miguel
  • Maarten Voors

Abstract

Where the state is weak, traditional authorities control the local provision of public goods. These leaders come from an older, less educated generation and often rule in an authoritarian and exclusionary fashion. This means the skills of community members may not be leveraged in policy making. We experimentally evaluate two solutions to this problem in Sierra Leone: one encourages delegation to higher skill individuals and a second fosters broader inclusion in decision-making. In a real-world infrastructure grants competition, a public nudge to delegate lead to better outcomes than the default of chiefly control, whereas attempts to boost participation were largely ineffective.

Suggested Citation

  • Katherine Casey & Rachel Glennerster & Edward Miguel & Maarten Voors, 2018. "Skill versus Voice in Local Development," NBER Working Papers 25022, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25022
    Note: DEV POL
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Michael Callen & Jonathan Weigel & Noam Yuchtman & Michael J. Callen, 2023. "Experiments about Institutions," CESifo Working Paper Series 10833, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • I25 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Education and Economic Development
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration

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