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Liquidity and Governance

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  • Kerry Back
  • Tao Li
  • Alexander Ljungqvist

Abstract

Is greater trading liquidity good or bad for corporate governance? We address this question both theoretically and empirically. We solve a model consisting of an optimal IPO followed by a dynamic Kyle market in which the large investor's private information concerns her own plans for taking an active role in governance. We show that an increase in the liquidity of the firm's stock increases the likelihood of the large investor 'taking the Wall Street walk.' Thus, higher liquidity is harmful for governance. Empirical tests using three distinct sources of exogenous variation in liquidity confirm the negative relation between liquidity and blockholder activism.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 19669.

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Date of creation: Nov 2013
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19669

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  23. Karthik Balakrishnan & Mary B. Billings & Bryan T. Kelly & Alexander Ljungqvist, 2013. "Shaping Liquidity: On the Causal Effects of Voluntary Disclosure," NBER Working Papers 18984, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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