The Development of Opacity in U.S. Banking
AbstractAn examination of U.S. banking history shows that economically efficient private bank money requires that information-revealing securities markets for bank liabilities be closed. That is, banks are optimally opaque, which is why they are regulated and examined. I show this by examining the transition from private bank notes, the predominant form of money before the U.S. Civil War, to demand deposits and show that markets endogenous closed. The opacity of bank money in the recent financial crisis is also briefly discussed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 19540.
Date of creation: Oct 2013
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Note: CF DAE ME
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
- E41 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Demand for Money
- E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
- E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-10-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2013-10-25 (Banking)
- NEP-HIS-2013-10-25 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-MAC-2013-10-25 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2013-10-25 (Monetary Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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