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Financial Protectionism: the First Tests

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  • Andrew K. Rose
  • Tomasz Wieladek

Abstract

We provide the first empirical tests for financial protectionism, defined as a nationalistic change in banks’ lending behaviour, as the result of public intervention, which leads domestic banks either to lend less or at higher interest rates to foreigners. We use a bank-level panel data set spanning all British and foreign banks providing loans within the United Kingdom between 1997Q3 and 2010Q1. During this time, a number of banks were nationalised, privatised, given unusual access to loan or credit guarantees, or received capital injections. We use standard empirical panel-data techniques to study the “loan mix,” domestic (British) loans of a bank expressed as a fraction of its total loan activity. We also study effective short-term interest rates, though our data set here is much smaller. We examine the loan mix for both British and foreign banks, both before and after unusual public interventions such as nationalisations and public capital injections. We find strong evidence of financial protectionism. After nationalisations, foreign banks reduced the fraction of loans going to the UK by about eleven percentage points and increased their effective interest rates by about 70 basis points. By way of contrast, nationalised British banks did not significantly change either their loan mix or effective interest rates. Succinctly, foreign nationalised banks seem to have engaged in financial protectionism, while British nationalised banks have not.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 17073.

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Date of creation: May 2011
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Publication status: published as “Financial Protectionism? First Evidence” (with Tomasz Wieladek), NBER WP 17,073, CEPR DP 8404, Bank of England MPC DP 32, Journal of Finance forthcoming.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17073

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  1. Andrew K. Rose & Mark M. Spiegel, 2004. "A Gravity Model of Sovereign Lending: Trade, Default, and Credit," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 51(s1), pages 50-63, June.
  2. Michael Ehrmann & Leonardo Gambacorta & Jorge Martínez-Pagés & Patrick Sevestre & Andreas Worms, 2001. "Financial Systems and the Role of Banks in Monetary Policy Transmission in the Euro Area," Banco de Espa�a Working Papers 0118, Banco de Espa�a.
  3. Aiyar, Shekhar, 2011. "How did the crisis in international funding markets affect bank lending? Balance sheet evidence from the United Kingdom," Bank of England working papers 424, Bank of England.
  4. Yacine Aït-Sahalia & Jochen Andritzky & Andreas Jobst & Sylwia Nowak & Natalia Tamirisa, 2010. "Market Response to Policy Initiatives during the Global Financial Crisis," NBER Working Papers 15809, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Buch, Claudia M, 2003. " Information or Regulation: What Drives the International Activities of Commercial Banks?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(6), pages 851-69, December.
  6. International Monetary Fund, 2009. "How to Stop a Herd of Running Bears? Market Response to Policy Initiatives During the Global Financial Crisis," IMF Working Papers 09/204, International Monetary Fund.
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