Are Franchises Bad Employers?
AbstractFranchise jobs are often described as representing the epitome of the "low road" approach to managing employees: high turnover, little training, deskilled jobs, and little employee involvement, practices often seen as unsophisticated. Research on franchise operations suggests, however, that the basic operating principles and practices of franchises tend to be more sophisticated than those of equivalent independent operators. We might therefore expect their employee management practices to be more advanced as well, challenging the stereotype of franchise jobs. We use data from a national probability sample of establishments to examine the relationship between franchise status and employment practices. While descriptive statistics suggest that franchise operations use low road practices, once industry, size, and other control variables are included in the analysis, franchise operations appear on important dimensions to offer better jobs with more sophisticated systems of employee management than similar non-franchise operations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 13327.
Date of creation: Aug 2007
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Peter Cappelli & Monika Hamori, 2008. "Are Franchises Bad Employers?," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 61(2), pages 147-162, January.
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Other versions of this item:
- Monika Hamori, 2006. "Are franchises bad employers?," Working Papers Economia, Instituto de Empresa, Area of Economic Environment wp06-11, Instituto de Empresa, Area of Economic Environment.
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-08-27 (All new papers)
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