An Empirical Look at Franchising as an Organizational Form
AbstractFranchise contracts are identified as a hybrid form of economic organization. Motives for the dominance of franchise arrangements are identified by examining the theoretical literature on franchising and related literatures on the theory of the firm, firm growth, managerial and employee selection, a nd brand-name capital. Empirical tests are performed on the incidence of franchise contracts across states for three industries in which f ranchising is prominent and data are readily available. The results s uggest that both principal-agent incentives and informational incenti ves favor the use of franchise arrangements. Copyright 1988 by the University of Chicago.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Business.
Volume (Year): 61 (1988)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JB/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.