Multi-Profile Intertemporal Social Choice
AbstractWe provide a brief survey of some literature on intertemporal social choice theory in a multi-profile setting. As is well-known, Arrow’s impossibility result hinges on the assumption that the population is finite. For infinite populations, there exist nondictatorial social welfare functions satisfying Arrow’s axioms and they can be described by their corresponding collections of decisive coalitions. We review contributions that explore whether this possibility in the infinite-population context allows for a richer class of social welfare functions in an intergenerational model. Different notions of stationarity formulated for individual and for social preferences are examined.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 09-2012.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: C.P. 6128, Succ. centre-ville, Montréal (PQ) H3C 3J7
Phone: (514) 343-6557
Fax: (514) 343-7221
Web page: http://www.cireq.umontreal.ca
More information through EDIRC
Infinite-population social choice; multi-profile social choice; decisiveness; intergenerational choice;
Other versions of this item:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sen, Amartya, 1995. "Rationality and Social Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 1-24, March.
- Bossert, Walter & Suzumura, Kotaro, 2010.
"Consistency, Choice, and Rationality,"
Harvard University Press, number 9780674052994.
- KIRMAN, Alan P. & SONDERMANN, Dieter, .
"Arrow's theorem, many agents, and indivisible dictators,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-118, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Kirman, Alan P. & Sondermann, Dieter, 1972. "Arrow's theorem, many agents, and invisible dictators," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 267-277, October.
- Campbell, Donald E., 1990. "Intergenerational social choice without the Pareto principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 414-423, April.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sharon BREWER).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.