In an infinite-horizon setting, Ferejohn and Page showed that Arrow's axioms and stationarity lead to a dictatorship by the first generation. Packel strengthened this result by proving that no collective choice rule generating complete social preferences can satisfy unlimited domain, weak Pareto and stationarity. We prove that a domain restriction can be imposed and completeness can be dropped without affecting the incompatibility. We propose a more suitable stationarity axiom and show that a social welfare function on a specific domain satisfies this modified version if and only if it is a chronological dictatorship.
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Paper provided by Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series PIE/CIS Discussion Paper with number
426.