Bureaucratic Corruption As a Constraint on Voter Choice
AbstractIt Has Often Been Assumed That a Country's Tax Level, Tax Structure Progressivity and After-Tax Income Distribution Are Chosen by Voters Subject Only to Their Budget Constraints. This Paper Argues That At Certain Income Levels Voters' Decisions May Be Constrained by Bureaucratic Corruption. the Theoretical Arguments Are Developed in Asymmetry Limits the Capacity of the Fiscal System to Generate Revenues by Means of Direct Taxes. This Hypothesis Is Tested Witha Sample of International Data by Means of a Simultaneous Equation Model. the Distortions Resulting From Corruption Ar Captured Through Their Effects on a Latent Variable Defined As the Overall Fiscal Structure. Evidence Is Found of Causality Running From This Latent Variable to the Level of Taxes and the Degree of After Tax Inequality.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 8635.
Length: 36P. pages
Date of creation: 1986
Date of revision:
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Bureaucracy ; Corruion ; Asymmetry ; Informa Tion ; Fiscal Policy;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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