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Uniform payoff security and Nash equilibrium in metric games Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Paulo Klinger Monteiro (FGV-EPGE)
Frank H. Page Jr () (Department of finance, University of Alabama)
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We introduce a condition, uniform payoff security, for games with separable metric strategy spaces and payoffs bounded and measurable in players' strategies. We show that if any such metric game G is uniformly payoff secure, then its mixed extension G is payoff secure. We also establish that if a uniformly payoff secure metric game G has compact strategy spaces, and if its mixed extension G has reciprocally upper semicontinuous payoffs, then G has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. We provide several economic examples of metric games satisfying uniform payoff security.
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Paper provided by Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) in its series Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques with number
b05086.
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Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2005Date of revision:
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Keywords: Uniform payoff security ; Nash equilibrium ; discontinuous games ; mixed extension. ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Simon, Leo K, 1987.
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Page, F.H.Jr. & Monteiro, P.K., 2001.
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The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
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