Competition in Health Care Markets and Vertical Restraints
AbstractThis paper studies competition between Managed Care Organizations (MCOs) and Conventional Insurers. Most of the time, MCOs sign exclusive contracts with providers and these vertical restrictions associated to differentiation in the providers’ market imply a risk segmentation. Taking into account this phenomenon, we show that vertical restrictions in the health insurance sector can paradoxically create an anti-raise rivals’ cost effect in which MCOs’ penetration allows to decrease conventional insurers’ premiums.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1 in its series Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) with number 2004.13.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: LASER, Faculté d'Economie, Avenue Raymond Dugrand, CS 79606, 34960 MONTPELLIER Cedex 2, France
Web page: http://www.laser.univ-montp1.fr
More information through EDIRC
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS ; MANAGED CARE ; COMPETITION POLICY.;
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
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