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Technology Sharing Cartels and Industrial Structure under a Rule of Thumb

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  • Ahmad Naimzada

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of Milan-Bicocca)

  • Emanuela Randon

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of Milan-Bicocca)

Abstract

We analyse the effect of learning by doing on firm performances when profit maximization follows a rule of thumb. Three regimes are compared: the technology sharing cartels, the oligopoly with spillovers, the proprietary regime. We show the dynamic implications on the industrial structure when firm production plan is revisited period by period.

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File URL: http://dipeco.economia.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper71.pdf
File Function: First version, 2004
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 71.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: May 2004
Date of revision: May 2004
Handle: RePEc:mib:wpaper:71

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Related research

Keywords: Oligopoly; Cartel; Industrial Structure; Learning; Dynamic Behaviour; Rule of Thumb;

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References

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  1. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & JACQUEMIN, Alexis, . "Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers," CORE Discussion Papers RP -823, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Allen, Robert C., 1983. "Collective invention," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 1-24, March.
  3. Baumol, William J, 1992. "Horizontal Collusion and Innovation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(410), pages 129-37, January.
  4. Petit, Maria Luisa & Tolwinski, Boleslaw, 1999. "R&D cooperation or competition?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 185-208, January.
  5. Vives, X., 1988. "Nash Equilibrium With Strategic Complementarities," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 107-88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  6. Allen, Thomas J. & Hyman, Diane B. & Pinckney, David L., 1983. "Transferring technology to the small manufacturing firm: A study of technology transfer in three countries," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 199-211, August.
  7. A. M. Spence, 1981. "The Learning Curve and Competition," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(1), pages 49-70, Spring.
  8. Malerba, Franco, 1992. "Learning by Firms and Incremental Technical Change," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(413), pages 845-59, July.
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