Cooperation without Punishment
AbstractOur experiment is made by three treatments. The first one reproduces the classical public good game. The second environment represents a perfect competition market where the contribution of a representative player to the private good gives a positive rent if and only if it is not lower than the highest contribution of the other players in the group. In the third treatment we consider a winner-take-all market where we have only a winner per group. The aim is to test whether the level of cooperation is minimum under the hypothesis of perfect competition.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 123.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2007
Date of revision: Oct 2007
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-10-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2007-10-13 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2007-10-13 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2007-10-13 (Game Theory)
- NEP-SOC-2007-10-13 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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