Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Can Tight and Centralized Financial Regulation Prevent Financial Crises? Czech Government Bond Seignorage in the Historical Perspective

Contents:

Author Info

  • Tomas Otahal

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics, Mendel University in Brno)

  • Vaclav Rybacek

    ()
    (University of Economics, Prague)

Abstract

Can tight and centralized financial regulation prevent financial crises? Governments usually respond to financial crises with tightening and centralizing financial regulation. In this paper, we explore the historical parallels between the governmental responses to the financial crises at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century in the USA and the recent response of the European Union. Our rent- seeking model with endogenous rent derived from the historical narrative predicts that tight and centralized financial regulation might increase the risk of inflationary monetary policy. To illustrate our findings on an empirical example, we calculated the Czech government bond seignorage that represents the rent extracted through inflationary monetary policy.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: ftp://ftp.mendelu.cz/RePEc/men/wpaper/14_2011.pdf
File Function: Full text
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Mendel University in Brno, Faculty of Business and Economics in its series MENDELU Working Papers in Business and Economics with number 2011-14.

as in new window
Length: 18
Date of creation: Oct 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:men:wpaper:14_2011

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Zemědělská 1, Brno
Phone: +420-5-45131111
Fax: +420-5-45212287
Email:
Web page: http://vyzc.pef.mendelu.cz/en
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Bureaucracy; corruption; economic efficiency; Chicago Public Choice; Virginia Public Choice; rent-seeking; rule of law;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. James Forder, 2003. "'Independence' and the founding of the Federal Reserve," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 50(3), pages 297-310, 08.
  2. Toma, Mark, 1982. "Inflationary bias of the Federal Reserve System : A bureaucratic perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 163-190.
  3. Rockoff, Hugh, 1972. "American Free Banking Before the Civil War: a Re-Examination," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(01), pages 417-420, March.
  4. Tomas Otahal, 2011. "Rent-Seeking Origins of Central Banks: The Case of the Federal Reserve System," MENDELU Working Papers in Business and Economics 2011-08, Mendel University in Brno, Faculty of Business and Economics.
  5. Lambsdorff, Johann Graf, 2002. " Corruption and Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(1-2), pages 97-125, October.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:men:wpaper:14_2011. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Luděk Kouba).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.