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Lucas Counter Example Revisited

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Author Info
Effrosyni Diamantoudi ()
Licun Xue ()

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Abstract

We revisit Lucas’(1968) counter example for the existence of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) stable set (solution) for coalitional games. We show that when we endow the agents with foresight, particularly, when we replace von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) dominance relation with the indirect dominance relations introduced by Harsanyi (1974), Lucas’s example admits a stable set.

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Paper provided by McGill University, Department of Economics in its series Departmental Working Papers with number 2005-09.

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Length: 9 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mcl:mclwop:2005-09

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C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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  1. Hannu Vartiainen, 2007. "Dynamic Farsighted Stability," Discussion Papers 22, Aboa Centre for Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Béal, Sylvain & Durieu, Jacques & Solal, Philippe, 2007. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-games," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 07-57, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
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