Inequality, communication and the avoidance of disastrous climate change
AbstractInternational efforts to provide global public goods often face the challenges of coordinating national contributions and distributing costs equitably in the face of uncertainty, inequality, and free-riding incentives. In an experimental setting, we distribute endowments unequally among a group of people who can reach a fixed target sum through successive money contributions, knowing that if they fail they will lose all their remaining money with 50% probability. We find that inequality reduces the prospects of reaching the target, but that communication increases success dramatically. Successful groups tend to eliminate inequality over the course of the game, with rich players signalling willingness to redistribute early on. Our results suggest that coordinative institutions and early redistribution from richer to poorer nations may widen our window of opportunity to avoid global climate calamity
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment in its series Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment Working Papers with number 34.
Date of creation: Jan 2011
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Alessandro Tavoni & Astrid Dannenberg & Giorgos Kallis & Andreas LÃ¶schel, 2011. "Inequality, Communication and the Avoidance of Disastrous Climate Change," CCEP Working Papers 1103, Centre for Climate Economics & Policy, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
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