The Political Economy of Financial Liberalisation
AbstractPolitical economy theories of financial development argue that in countries where a narrow elite controls political decisions, financial development may be deliberately obstructed to deny access to finance to potential competitors. This paper empirically examines whether the level of liberalisation of the banking system, the stock market and capital account depend on regime characteristics, using panel data from 26 countries from 1973 – 1999. Our results show that it is predominantly fully democratic regimes that have liberalised financial systems. Countries that are not fully democratic have a lower probability of having liberal banking systems and capital accounts and this probability decreases with increasing democratisation. This suggests that the attractiveness of using financial levers to allocate funds in the economy increases with the amount of competition the government faces, although a fully competitive electoral system creates incentives to relinquish financial control.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Leicester in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 05/12.
Date of creation: May 2005
Date of revision: Oct 2005
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Other versions of this item:
- Anja Shortland & Sourafel Girma, 2005. "The Political Economy of Financial Liberalisation," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2005 39, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
- O16 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-05-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2005-05-23 (Development)
- NEP-HIS-2005-05-23 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-POL-2005-05-23 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"The Political Economy of Corporate Governance,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2682, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Beck, Thorsten & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Levine, Ross, 2004.
"Finance, inequality, and poverty: cross-country evidence,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
3338, The World Bank.
- Thorsten Beck & Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Ross Levine, 2004. "Finance, Inequality, and Poverty: Cross-Country Evidence," NBER Working Papers 10979, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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