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Approche Conceptuelle et Algorithmique des Equilibres de Nash Robustes Incitatifs

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Cédric Wanko
Abstract

On propose une analyse de la robustesse des équilibres de Nash dans le cadre d’un mécanisme Bayésien incitatif. On met en valeur une contrainte de robustesse comme élément de réponse au problème de rationalité individuelle (intermédiaire) selon 1) une approche conceptuelle des propriétés de la solution d’équilibre et 2) une approche algorithmique du protocole et des étapes calculatoires.

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File URL: http://www.lameta.univ-montp1.fr/Fr/Productions/Documents/DR2008-03.pdf
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Paper provided by LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier in its series Working Papers with number 08-03.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2008
Date of revision: Feb 2008
Handle: RePEc:lam:wpaper:08-03

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  1. Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Kats, Amoz & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1992. "Unilaterally Competitive Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 291-99.
  3. DE WOLF, Olivier & ,, 1999. "Optimal strategies in N-person unilaterally competitive games," CORE Discussion Papers 1999049, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
  4. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Lehrer, Ehud & Sorin, Sylvain, 1997. "One-Shot Public Mediated Talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 131-148, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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