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Pre-emptive Search and R&D Clustering

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Author Info

  • James H. Cardon

    (Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah)

  • Dan Sasaki

    (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen)

Abstract

While many preceding studies on R&D discuss the equilibrium amount and speed of the R&D investment, this paper focuses on its equilibrium direction. Under a broad class of parametric conditions, there is a pure-strategy equilibrium in which multiple firms "cluster", i.e. search for the same potential project even if [i] potential projects are ex ante homogeneous, [ii] firms have negative, not positive, externalities toward each other in that a potential project can be made into a profit-making patent by no more than one firm, and [iii] firms have simultaneous moves so that there is no informational spillover between them. Economic applications of this "clustering" equilibrium result are not confined to the R&D investment. Any situation where agents are racing in search of economic opportunities can be an example of this model.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 96-21.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Dec 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:9621

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Cited by:
  1. L. Lambertini & P. Tedeschi, 2000. "On the Social Desirability of Patents for Sequential Innovations in a Vertically Differentiated Market," Working Papers 376, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  2. Gerlach, Heiko A. & Rønde, Thomas & Stahl, Konrad O., 2002. "Market and Technical Risk in R&D," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 3450, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Andreas Fier & Dietmar Harhoff, 2002. "Die Evolution der bundesdeutschen Forschungs- und Technologiepolitik: Rückblick und Bestandsaufnahme," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 3(3), pages 279-301, 08.
  4. Nisvan Erkal & Deborah Minehart, 2007. "Optimal Sharing Strategies in Dynamic Games of Research and Development," EAG Discussions Papers, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division 200707, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
  5. Jay Pil Choi & Heiko Gerlach, 2011. "Selection Biases in Complementary R&D Projects," CESifo Working Paper Series 3425, CESifo Group Munich.

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