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Selection Biases in Complementary R&D Projects

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  • Jay Pil Choi
  • Heiko Gerlach

Abstract

This paper analyzes selection biases in the project choice of complementary technologies that are used in combination to produce a final product. In the presence of complementary technologies, patents allow innovating firms to hold up rivals who succeed in developing other system components. This hold-up potential induces firms to preemptively claim stakes on component property rights and excessively cluster their R&D efforts on a relatively easier technology. This selection bias is persistent and robust to several model extensions. Implications for the optimal design of intellectual property rights are discussed. We also analyze selection biases that arise when firms differ in research capabilities.

Suggested Citation

  • Jay Pil Choi & Heiko Gerlach, 2011. "Selection Biases in Complementary R&D Projects," CESifo Working Paper Series 3425, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3425
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    Cited by:

    1. Jay Pil Choi & Heiko Gerlach, 2014. "Selection Biases in Complementary R&D Projects," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(4), pages 899-924, December.
    2. Nancy Gallini, 2011. "Private agreements for coordinating patent rights: the case of patent pools," ECONOMIA E POLITICA INDUSTRIALE, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2011(3), pages 5-30.
    3. Matros, Alexander & Smirnov, Vladimir, 2011. "Treasure game," Working Papers 2011-10, University of Sydney, School of Economics, revised May 2014.
    4. Patrick Herbst & Eric Jahn, 2017. "IP-for-IP or Cash-for-IP? R&D Competition and the Market for Technology," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 51(1), pages 75-101, August.
    5. Annalisa Biagi & Vincenzo Denicolò, 2014. "Timing of Discovery and the Division of Profit With Complementary Innovations," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(1), pages 89-102, March.
    6. Kaustav Das & Nicolas Klein, 2020. "Do Stronger Patents Lead to Faster Innovation? The Effect of Duplicative Search," Discussion Papers in Economics 20/03, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
    7. Matros, Alexander & Smirnov, Vladimir, 2016. "Duplicative search," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 1-22.
    8. Yongmin Chen & Shiyuan Pan & Tianle Zhang, 2018. "Patentability, R&D Direction, And Cumulative Innovation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1969-1993, November.
    9. Choi, Jay Pil & Jeon, Doh-Shin, 2020. "Platform Design Biases in Two-Sided Markets," TSE Working Papers 20-1143, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    10. Jay Pil Choi & Doh-Shin Jeon, 2020. "Two-Sided Platforms and Biases in Technology Adoption," CESifo Working Paper Series 8559, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    R&D project choice; preemptive duplication; complementary innovations;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • O30 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - General

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