Influence Costs in Heterogeneous Cooperatives: A Formal Model of Sales Distortion
AbstractModern agricultural marketing cooperatives must implement farm-level differentiation to meet requirements from high-quality market segments, e.g. consumers focusing on animal welfare. This makes the cooperatives internally heterogeneous and increases the influence costs. In particular, the marketing of special high-quality products is a controversial issue for cooperatives, because different producer groups have different interests. The standard producers, who normally hold the majority vote in the cooperatives, are reluctant to promote the sale of specialty products and hereby increase the bargaining power of the specialty producers. We explore these arguments in a formal model.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics in its series CIE Discussion Papers with number 2002-05.
Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2002
Date of revision:
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Cooperatives; Influence Costs; Market Innovation;
Other versions of this item:
- Bogetoft, Peter & Olesen, Henrik Ballebye, 2003. "Influence Costs In Heterogeneous Cooperatives: A Formal Model Of Sales Distortion," 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada 22190, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
- Q13 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness
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- Murray Fulton & Konstantinos Giannakas, 2001. "Organizational Commitment in a Mixed Oligopoly: Agricultural Cooperatives and Investor-Owned Firms," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1258-1265.
- George Hendrikse & Jos Bijman, 2002. "On the emergence of new growers' associations: self-selection versus countervailing power," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 29(2), pages 255-269, June.
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