Influence Costs in Heterogeneous Cooperatives: A Formal Model of Sales Distortion

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Influence Costs in Heterogeneous Cooperatives: A Formal Model of Sales Distortion

Author Info

Peter Bogetoft (Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University, Denmark)
Henrik B. Olesen (Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University, Denmark)

Abstract

Modern agricultural marketing cooperatives must implement farm-level differentiation to meet requirements from high-quality market segments, e.g. consumers focusing on animal welfare. This makes the cooperatives internally heterogeneous and increases the influence costs. In particular, the marketing of special high-quality products is a controversial issue for cooperatives, because different producer groups have different interests. The standard producers, who normally hold the majority vote in the cooperatives, are reluctant to promote the sale of specialty products and hereby increase the bargaining power of the specialty producers. We explore these arguments in a formal model.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics in its series CIE Discussion Papers with number 2002-05.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kud:kuieci:2002-05

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Øster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark
Phone: (0045) 35 32 30 54
Fax: +45 35 32 30 00
Web page: http://www.econ.ku.dk/cie/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Henriette Aabo Hansen).

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
Q13 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2003-04-02 (All new papers)
NEP-IND-2003-04-02 (Industrial Organization)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Paul Milgrom and John Roberts., 1987. "Bargaining and Influence Costs and the Organization of Economic Activity," Economics Working Papers 8731, University of California at Berkeley.
Fulton, Murray & Giannakas, Konstantinos, 2001. " Organizational Commitment in a Mixed Oligopoly: Agricultural Cooperatives and Investor-Owned Firms," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, American Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1258-65. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Apart from a small start up grant in the 1990's, RePEc has received no funding and lives on the help of volunteers.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.