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Do Anti-Dumping Rules Facilitate the Abuse of Market Dominance?

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  • Martin Theuringer

    ()

  • Pia Weiß

    ()

Abstract

We discuss the effects of AD-protection in a standard Dixit model of entry deterrence. In an AD-regime, the newcomer is constrained by a minimum-price rule in addition to existing irreversible entrance costs. For minimum prices which lie below the Stackelberg one, we find that AD-rules distort competition. We show that AD-protection increases the advantages of entry deterrence for a wide range of combinations of sunk costs and minimum prices. When entrance costs are high, consumer welfare is lower in an AD-regime than under free trade. Consequently, AD-protection facilitates the abuse of market dominance.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for Economic Policy, Cologne, Germany in its series IWP Discussion Paper Series with number 03/2001.

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Date of creation: Mar 2001
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Handle: RePEc:kln:iwpdip:dp03/01

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Keywords: Anti-dumping; abuse of market dominance; strategic firm behaviour;

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  1. Finger, J. Michael & Schuknecht, Ludger, 1999. "Market access advances and retreats : the Uruguay Round and beyond," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2232, The World Bank.
  2. Michael O. Moore, 2005. "VERs and Price Undertakings under the WTO," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 298-310, 05.
  3. Wilfried Pauwels & Hylke Vandenbussche & Marcel Weverbergh, 2001. "Strategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Duties," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 75-99.
  4. Campbell, Neil, 2000. "Import Quotas and Entry Deterrence," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(2), pages 152-58, June.
  5. Dixit, Avinash K & Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "The Use of Protection and Subsidies for Entry Promotion and Deterrence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 139-52, March.
  6. Fischer, Ronald D., 1992. "Endogenous probability of protection and firm behavior," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-2), pages 149-163, February.
  7. Dixit, Avinash, 1980. "The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 90(357), pages 95-106, March.
  8. Moore, Michael O., 2005. ""Facts available" dumping allegations: when will foreign firms cooperate in antidumping petitions?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 185-204, March.
  9. Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, 1989. "Strategic Use of Antidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusion," NBER Working Papers 3016, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1981. "Tariffs and the Extraction of Foreign Monopoly Rents under Potential Entry," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 14(3), pages 371-89, August.
  11. Reitzes, James D, 1993. "Antidumping Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(4), pages 745-63, November.
  12. Bruce A. Blonigen & Thomas J. Prusa, 2001. "Antidumping," NBER Working Papers 8398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Prusa, Thomas J., 1992. "Why are so many antidumping petitions withdrawn?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1-2), pages 1-20, August.
  14. Arvind Panagariya & Poonam Gupta, 1998. "Anti-dumping Duty versus Price Negotiations," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(8), pages 1003-1019, November.
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