Delegation and Limited Liability in a Modern Capitalistic Economy
AbstractWe examine an effect of limited liability on strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly with demand uncertainty. We establish that owners of each firm always delegate their tasks, decisions, and responsibility to a manager under limited liability, while they do not always do so under unlimited liability. This result is consistent with the fact that separation of ownership and management as well as limited liability prevail in many modern large companies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number 87.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2012
Date of revision: Apr 2012
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limited liability; delegation; managerial incentives; and Cournot duopoly;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-04-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2012-04-23 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CFN-2012-04-23 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-COM-2012-04-23 (Industrial Competition)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"The Theory of the Firm,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521517386, November.
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- Tetsuya Shinkai & Takao Ohkawa & Makoto Okamura & Kozo Harimaya, 2012. "Why did the Dutch East India Co. outperform the British East India Co.? —A theoretical explanation based on the objective of the firm and limited liability—," Discussion Paper Series 96, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Dec 2012.
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