The Effects of Corporate Finance on Firm Risk-taking and Performance: Theory and Evidence
AbstractSome firms may exhibit better operating performance than others because they undertake riskier projects: risk-return tradeoff. We develop a model to examine the effects of financial contracts on a firmfs choice between safer (lower risk, lower return) and riskier (higher risk, higher return) projects. The model shows that, assuming a competitive capital market (i.e., financiers with no monopoly power), three types of financial contracts (rollover loans, non-rollover loans, and new share issues) can each be an equilibrium contract, depending on conditions. While firms undertake griskierh projects when using non-rollover loans or new share issues, firms undertake gsaferh projects when using rollover loans. The model emphasizes the role of rollover loans (with passive monitoring) as a potential disciplinary device to suppress a firmfs risk-taking. The model generates several predictions about the determinants of a firmfs risk-taking and its performance. One key prediction of the model is that (risk-neutral) firms with closer bank relationships are more likely to use rollover loans and undertake gsaferh projects, even with a contestable capital market. We find novel empirical support for the modelfs predictions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number 45.
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: May 2009
Date of revision: May 2009
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Web page: http://www-econ.kwansei.ac.jp/~econ/index_e.html
More information through EDIRC
corporate finance; corporate governance; firm risk-taking; firm performance; loan rollover;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-05-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2009-05-23 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CFN-2009-05-23 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-CTA-2009-05-23 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-PPM-2009-05-23 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kose John & Lubomir Litov & Bernard Yeung, 2008. "Corporate Governance and Risk-Taking," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(4), pages 1679-1728, 08.
- Grinstein, Yaniv, 2006. "The disciplinary role of debt and equity contracts: Theory and tests," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 419-443, October.
- David E. Weinstein & Yishay Yafeh, 1998. "On the Costs of a Bank-Centered Financial System: Evidence from the Changing Main Bank Relations in Japan," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(2), pages 635-672, 04.
- Gorton, Gary & Kahn, James, 2000. "The Design of Bank Loan Contracts," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 13(2), pages 331-64.
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