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Examining Patent Examiners: Present Bias, Procrastination and Task Performance

Author

Listed:
  • Ryo Nakajima

    (Faculty of Economics, Keio University)

  • Michitaka Sasaki

    (Organization for Research Initiative and Promotion, Tottori University)

  • Ryuichi Tamura

    (Faculty of International Studies and Regional Development, University of Niigata)

Abstract

This paper explores the unproductive procrastination behavior of patent examiners, probes whether such behavior is caused by present-biased preferences, and estimates the magnitude. We set out a quasihyperbolic discounting model where a patent examiner is assigned a biweekly quota of patent application reviews and determines the level of effort by the deadline. We estimate the present-bias factor of each patent examiner based on patent prosecution data in the U.S. and find that the proportion of present-biased individuals exceeds the majority. We demonstrate that the job separation rate is higher for less present-biased patent examiners, and a fragmented work quota can improve patent examination quality and timeliness.

Suggested Citation

  • Ryo Nakajima & Michitaka Sasaki & Ryuichi Tamura, 2020. "Examining Patent Examiners: Present Bias, Procrastination and Task Performance," Keio-IES Discussion Paper Series 2020-015, Institute for Economics Studies, Keio University.
    • Handle: RePEc:keo:dpaper:2020-015
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    patent examination; procrastination; present bias; quasihyperbolic discounting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • J01 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics: General
    • K29 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Other
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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