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New Pay: Welche Anreize funktionieren überhaupt noch?

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  • Eichhorst, Werner

    (IZA)

  • Linckh, Carolin

    (IZA)

Abstract

Die Arbeitswelt wandelt sich hin zu komplexeren und interaktiveren Tätigkeiten. Dabei wächst die Bedeutung von Wissen und intrinsischer Motivation, während die Messbarkeit von Leistungen anhand einfacher Zielindikatoren zurückgeht und individuelle leistungsorientierte Vergütungsbestandteile Fehlanreize setzen können, wie neuere Erkenntnisse aus der Verhaltensökonomie belegen. Deshalb müssen Vergütungsmodelle den Anforderungen der modernen Arbeitswelt gerecht werden und entsprechend verändert werden. Für die Zukunft bieten sich vor allem drei Bausteine bei der variablen Vergütung an: erstens eine Vergütung, die am Firmen- oder Teamerfolg ansetzt anstatt individuellen Erfolg zu prämieren; zweitens Entlohnungs- und Arbeitsgestaltungsmodelle nach dem Cafeteria-Prinzip mit individuellen Wahlmöglichkeiten; und drittens können Kapitalbeteiligungen neben dem verteilungspolitischen Aspekt die Motivation steigern, ohne viel Detailsteuerung zu benötigen.

Suggested Citation

  • Eichhorst, Werner & Linckh, Carolin, 2019. "New Pay: Welche Anreize funktionieren überhaupt noch?," IZA Standpunkte 95, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izasps:sp95
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Vergütung; Leistungsanreize; variable Entgeltbestandteile; Kapitalbeteiligung; Zukunft der Arbeit;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • J54 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Producer Cooperatives; Labor Managed Firms

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