Tipping and Residential Segregation: A Unified Schelling Model
AbstractThis paper presents a Schelling-type checkerboard model of residential segregation formulated as a spatial game. It shows that although every agent prefers to live in a mixed-race neighborhood, complete segregation is observed almost all of the time. A concept of tipping is rigorously defined, which is crucial for understanding the dynamics of segregation. Complete segregation emerges and persists in the checkerboard model precisely because tipping is less likely to occur to such residential patterns. Agent-based simulations are used to illustrate how an integrated residential area is tipped into complete segregation and why this process is irreversible. This model incorporates insights from Schelling's two classical models of segregation (the checkerboard model and the neighborhood tipping model) and puts them on a rigorous footing. It helps us better understand the persistence of residential segregation in urban America.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 4413.
Length: 54 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Journal of Regional Science, 2011, 51(1), 167-193
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Other versions of this item:
- Junfu Zhang, 2011. "Tipping And Residential Segregation: A Unified Schelling Model," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(1), pages 167-193, 02.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- R13 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - General Equilibrium and Welfare Economic Analysis of Regional Economies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-10-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-CMP-2009-10-10 (Computational Economics)
- NEP-GEO-2009-10-10 (Economic Geography)
- NEP-URE-2009-10-10 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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- Zhang, Junfu & Zheng, Liang, 2014. "Are Ghettos Good or Bad? Evidence from U.S. Internal Migration," IZA Discussion Papers 8093, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Grauwin, Sébastian & Goffette-Nagot, Florence & Jensen, Pablo, 2012.
"Dynamic models of residential segregation: An analytical solution,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 124-141.
- Sebastian Grauwin & Florence Goffette-Nagot & Pablo Jensen, 2010. "Dynamic models of residential segregation : an analytical solution," Working Papers 1017, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
- Sébastian Grauwin & Florence Goffette-Nagot & Pablo Jensen, 2010. "Dynamic models of residential ségrégation: an analytical solution," Post-Print halshs-00502758, HAL.
- Sebastian Grauwin & Florence Goffette-Nagot & Pablo Jensen, 2012. "Dynamic models of residential segregation: An analytical solution," Post-Print hal-00650292, HAL.
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