Ramón Faulí-Oller () (Universidad de Alicante) Lluís Bru () (Universitat de les Illes Balears) Joel Sandonís () (Universidad de Alicante)
Abstract
We analyze third degree price discrimination by an upstream monopolistto a continuum of heterogeneous downstream firms. The novelty of ourapproach is to recognize that customizing prices may be costly, whichintroduces an interesting trade-off. As a consequence, partial pricediscrimination arises in equilibrium. In particular, we show that inefficientdownstream firms receive personalized prices whereas efficient firms arecharged a uniform price. The extreme cases of complete price discriminationand uniform price arise in our setting as particular cases, depending on the costof customizing prices.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number
2006-03.
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