We put in perspective two competing hypothesis on the nature of intergenerational transfers: altruism vs. exchange motivation. Unlike previous approaches, we concentrate on non-monetary transfers measured as the effort that parents need to make in order to prevent children?s fatal health episodes. It is shown that, under the pure altruism hypothesis richer parents should be more prompt than poorer ones to exert this effort in the face of a bad-health signal. Inversely, richer parents would need to observe a higher signal than poorer when parents consider raising healthy children as an investment for the future times. Using data on frequency of utilization of the emergency room services and doctor?s office visits by low-age children, infant mortality and home-accident preventive care, we reject the null of altruism. Instead, we conclude that exchange motives do not enter into contradiction with the evidence.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number
2003-26.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism D91 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Production J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Bernheim, B Douglas & Shleifer, Andrei & Summers, Lawrence H, 1985.
"The Strategic Bequest Motive,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1045-76, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Bernheim, B Douglas & Shleifer, Andrei & Summers, Lawrence H, 1986.
"The Strategic Bequest Motive,"
Journal of Labor Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(3), pages S151-82, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)