Network Formation And Anti-Coordination Games
AbstractWe study a setting in which individual players choose their partners as well as a mode of behavior in 2 x 2 anti-coordination games -- games where a player's best response is to behave differently than the opponent. We characterize the nature of equilibrium networks as well as study the effects of network structure on individual behavior. Our analysis shows that both the network architecture and the induced behavior are crucially dependent on the value of the cost of forming links. In general, the equilibrium configurations are found to be neither unique nor efficient. This conclusion continues to hold if the population game is embedded in a standard evolutionary model of learning, since all equilibria turn out to be stochastically stable.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number 2002-25.
Length: 48 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2002
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published by Ivie
networks; links; anti-coordination games; efficiency.;
Other versions of this item:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dutta, B. & Nouweland, C.G.A.M. van den & Tijs, S.H., 1998.
"Link formation in cooperative situations,"
Open Access publications from Tilburg University
urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-77112, Tilburg University.
- Dutta, B. & Nouweland, C.G.A.M. van den & Tijs, S.H., 1995. "Link formation in cooperative situations," Discussion Paper 1995-35, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Dutta, B. & Nouweland, C.G.A.M. van den & Tijs, S.H., 2003. "Link formation in cooperative situations," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-121826, Tilburg University.
- Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
- Rachel E. Kranton & Deborah F. Minehart, 2001. "A Theory of Buyer-Seller Networks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 485-508, June.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Alison Watts, 2000.
"On the Formation of Interaction Networks in Social Coordination Games,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
0778, Econometric Society.
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Watts, Alison, 2002. "On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 265-291, November.
- Goyal, S. & Vega-Redondo, F., 2000.
"Learning, Network Formation and Coordination,"
Econometric Institute Report
EI 9954-/A, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Econometric Institute.
- Sanjeev Goyal & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 2000. "Learning, Network Formation and Coordination," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0113, Econometric Society.
- Fernando Vega Redondo & Sanjeev Goyal, 2001. "Learning, Network Formation And Coordination," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-19, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Sanjeev Goyal & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 2000. "Learning, Network Formation and Coordination," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-093/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991.
"Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games,"
71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
- Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
- M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob, 1999. "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 500, David K. Levine.
- Samuelson Larry, 1994. "Stochastic Stability in Games with Alternative Best Replies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 35-65, October.
- Aderlini, L. & Ianni, A., 1993.
"Path Dependence and Learning from Neighbours,"
186, Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals.
- Glen Ellison, 2010.
"Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
391, David K. Levine.
- Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez, 2007. "A Bargaining Approach To Coordination In Networks," Working Papers. Serie AD 2007-28, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Filippo Vergara Caffarelli, 2009. "Networks with decreasing returns to linking," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 734, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- Feri, Francesco, 2007. "Stochastic stability in networks with decay," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 442-457, July.
- Rong Rong & Daniel Houser, 2012. "Growing Stars: A Laboratory Analysis of Network Formation," Working Papers 1035, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, revised Oct 2012.
- Siegfried Berninghaus & Stephan Schosser & Bodo Vogt, 2011. "Complexity of Networking - An Experimental Study of the Network Hawk Dove Game," FEMM Working Papers 110024, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
- Bramoulle, Yann, 2007. "Anti-coordination and social interactions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 30-49, January.
- Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Ott, Marion, 2012. "Forward-looking behavior in Hawk–Dove games in endogenous networks: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 35-52.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Departamento de Edición).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.