Externalities, Social Pressures, and Political Parties
AbstractMembers of political parties talk to each other often, and may thereby influence each other. For example, a liberal in a party of moderates may moderate his views. At the same time, the moderates in the party may become more sympathetic to liberal views. Voters in a district may favor such effects if they care about the ideology of officeholders in other districts. They may therefore prefer a candidate who affiliates with a party over an independent with the same position.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 060709.
Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2006
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-11-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2006-11-12 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-NET-2006-11-12 (Network Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2006-11-12 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2006-11-12 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2006-11-12 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, .
"An Economic Model of Representative Democracy,"
Penn CARESS Working Papers, Penn Economics Department
ecf70d639d700dba5327ab0c8, Penn Economics Department.
- Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, . ""An Economic Model of Representative Democracy''," CARESS Working Papres, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences 95-02, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Harrington, Joseph Jr., 1992. "The role of party reputation in the formation of policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 107-121, October.
- Becker, Gary S & Murphy, Kevin M, 1988.
"A Theory of Rational Addiction,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(4), pages 675-700, August.
- Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, 1986. "A Theory of Rational Addiction," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State 41, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
- Alesina, Alberto & Spear, Stephen, 1988.
"An Overlapping Generations Model of Electoral Competition,"
4553015, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alesina, Alberto & Spear, Stephen E., 1988. "An overlapping generations model of electoral competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 359-379, December.
- Alberto Alesina & Stephen E. Spear, 1987. "An Overlapping Generations Model of Electoral Competition," NBER Working Papers 2354, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Moselle, Boaz, 1998.
"Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game,"
Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
1036, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Moselle, Boaz, 2002. "Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 49-87, March.
- Bernard Caillaud & Jean Tirole, 2002. "Parties As Political Intermediaries," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 117(4), pages 1453-1489, November.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jennifer dos Santos).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.