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No response to changes in marginal incentives in one-shot public good experiments

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  • Natalie Struwe
  • Esther Blanco
  • James M. Walker

Abstract

We report novel results from changes in the marginal per capita return (MPCR) in a one-shot public good game where participants make a single provision decision. Data was collected using three data collection processes: an online experiment conducted on Prolific, an online experiment conducted with a subject pool of university students, and an experiment implemented following the conventional procedures of the economic laboratory with university students. In three between-subject treatment conditions, we confront participants from each of these three samples with either a low MPCR of 0.4, a high MPCR of 0.8 holding constant the individual endowment, or a high MPCR of 0.8 reducing the individual endowment to hold constant maximum possible group earnings. Based on a total sample size of 952 participants, we find that, unlike results from previous experiments where subjects make multiple contribution decisions in varying experimental designs, contributions to the public good are not significantly different for the different MPCR conditions we study. We consider these results to be highly relevant in highlighting the limits to our understanding of cooperative behavior for settings without repeated interactions.

Suggested Citation

  • Natalie Struwe & Esther Blanco & James M. Walker, 2023. "No response to changes in marginal incentives in one-shot public good experiments," Working Papers 2023-08, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    • Handle: RePEc:inn:wpaper:2023-08
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. R. Mark Isaac & James M. Walker, 1988. "Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(1), pages 179-199.
    5. R. Isaac & James Walker & Susan Thomas, 1984. "Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 113-149, January.
    6. Stephan Kroll & Todd Cherry & Jason Shogren, 2007. "The impact of endowment heterogeneity and origin on contributions in best-shot public good games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(4), pages 411-428, December.
    7. Stoddard, Brock, 2017. "Risk in payoff-equivalent appropriation and provision games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 78-82.
    8. Isaac, R. Mark & Walker, James M. & Williams, Arlington W., 1994. "Group size and the voluntary provision of public goods : Experimental evidence utilizing large groups," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 1-36, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gächter, Simon & Fages, Diego Marino, 2023. "Using the Strategy Method and Elicited Beliefs to Explain Group Size and MPCR Effects in Public Good Experiments," IZA Discussion Papers 16605, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voluntary contribution mechanism; Public goods; Marginal per capita return; Social dilemma; Experiments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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