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Trade Policy Implications of a Changing World: Tariffs and Import Market Power

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  • Adam Jakubik
  • Alexander Keck
  • Roberta Piermartini

Abstract

Economic theory suggests that countries’ tariff commitments in trade agreements reflect their import market power at the time of negotiations. However, as countries grow, their market power in different sectors can change in unforeseen ways and their commitments may no longer reflect changed economic conditions. Using a newly built dataset of pre-Uruguay Round applied tariffs and relying on the theoretical framework of the terms-of-trade motive for trade agreements, we estimate hypothetical tariff commitments under current levels of market power and compare them with actual tariff commitments. We find that lower tariff commitments required to reflect current economic conditions would amount to a reduction in annual tariff costs of up to $26.4 billion – equivalent to nearly 10% of global tariff costs. Our results reveal substantial heterogeneity between countries and sectors. The sectors with the largest potential tariff cost reductions are vehicles (HS 87) and machinery and appliances (HS 84-85). Product-level tariff reductions would range from 0 to 18.5 percentage points and are on average largest for China. In the past, the GATT/WTO system has updated tariff commitments through periodic rounds of negotiations, and our findings support the revival of the WTO's negotiation function in this area.

Suggested Citation

  • Adam Jakubik & Alexander Keck & Roberta Piermartini, 2023. "Trade Policy Implications of a Changing World: Tariffs and Import Market Power," IMF Working Papers 2023/005, International Monetary Fund.
  • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2023/005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Wenxin Wang & Yaowen Liang & Zhuo Ru & Haojie Guo & Bingjie Zhao, 2023. "World Forage Import Market: Competitive Structure and Market Forces," Agriculture, MDPI, vol. 13(9), pages 1-18, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    trade agreements; trade policy; terms of trade; import market power; WTO system; WTO member; tariff commitment; trade policy implication; WTO's negotiation function; Tariffs; Imports; Global;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F11 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Neoclassical Models of Trade
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations

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