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The Farrell and Shapiro condition revisited

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Author Info

  • Duarte Brito

    () (IET, FCT-Universidade Nova de Lisboa)

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to study the consequences of using the Farrell and Shapiro (1990) sufficient condition for merger approval to sectors in which a downstream horizontal merger may also affect upstream firms. As will be shown below, in some circumstances the sign of the relevant external effect can no longer be established by considering the merger as a sequence of in finitesimal mergers, each corresponding to a marginal change in output.

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File URL: http://run.unl.pt/handle/10362/1690
File Function: First version, 2007
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Universidade Nova de Lisboa, IET-Research Center on Enterprise and Work Innovation, Faculty of Science and Technology in its series IET Working Papers Series with number 01/2007.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ieu:wpaper:01

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Related research

Keywords: Mergers;

References

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  1. Barros, Pedro P. & Cabral, Luis, 1994. "Merger policy in open economies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 1041-1055, May.
  2. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt0tp305nx, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  3. al-Nowaihi, A. & Levine, P. L., 1985. "The stability of the cournot oligopoly model: A reassessment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 307-321, August.
  4. Pita Barros, Pedro Luis, 1997. "Approval Rules for Sequential Horizontal Mergers," CEPR Discussion Papers 1764, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Dobson, Paul W & Waterson, Michael, 1997. "Countervailing Power and Consumer Prices," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(441), pages 418-30, March.
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