On asymmetry in all-pay auctions
AbstractThis paper examines the role of asymmetry in all-pay auctions. In particular, this paper decomposes a change in players' valuations into the absolute change and the relative change, and analyzes how these changes a¢çect total expenditures. An increase in the sum of players' valuations increases total expenditures but an increase in asymmetry among players' valuations tends to decrease total expenditures both under complete and incomplete information.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Korea University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number 1208.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Asymmetry; All-pay auctions; Contests; Optimal mechanisms;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-09-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2012-09-03 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2012-09-03 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Nicolas Sahuguet, 2006. "Caps in asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(9), pages 1-8.
- Kovenock, D. & de Vries, C.G., 1995.
"The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information,"
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311.95, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C., 1992. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," Papers 8-92-1, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1991. "The All-Pay Auction With Complete Information," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1007, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- Baye, M. & Kovenock, D. & Vries, C. de, 1990. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," Discussion Paper 1990-51, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Varies, C.G., 1990. "The All-Pay Auction With Complete Information," Papers 9051, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Rene Kirkegaard, 2010.
"Incomplete Information and Rent Dissipation in Deterministic Contests,"
1012, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Kirkegaard, René, 2013. "Incomplete information and rent dissipation in deterministic contests," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 261-266.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2006:i:9:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
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