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Social Services Viewed Through New Lenses: Agency Problems in Education and Health in Latin America

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  • Savedoff, William D.

Abstract

Latin America spends large amounts of resources on social services, yet its life expectancy and education levels are low compared to other regions with similar levels of income. A key reason is the inherent difficulty of making social services produce efficiently in response to demands and needs. This working paper shows how improving the organization of these service systems can make a significant difference in health conditions and student learning. A general framework applying the lessons of theories of the firm to the particularities of social services is developed, followed by a summary of case studies which assess the impact of organization on performance in education and in health. The paper shows that the relationships and rules followed by governments, service providers, and consumers can mean the difference between success and failure. It also describes a wealth of approaches that point toward better ways of organizing social services and ultimately improving health and education in the region.

Suggested Citation

  • Savedoff, William D., 1997. "Social Services Viewed Through New Lenses: Agency Problems in Education and Health in Latin America," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 6135, Inter-American Development Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:idb:brikps:6135
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Antonio Estache & J. Cremer & Paul Seabright, 1996. "Decentralizing Public Services: What can we learn from the Theory of the Firm?," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/44016, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    2. Randall P. Ellis & Thomas G. McGuire, 1993. "Supply-Side and Demand-Side Cost Sharing in Health Care," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 135-151, Fall.
    3. Caroline Minter Hoxby, 1996. "How Teachers' Unions Affect Education Production," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(3), pages 671-718.
    4. Gaynor, Martin, 1994. "Issues in the Industrial Organization of the Market for Physician Services," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 211-255, Spring.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mariano Tommasi & Silvana Tenreyro, 2001. "Comments on Dani Rodrik's "Why Is There So Much Economic Insecurity in Latin America?"," Working Papers 28, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Mar 2001.
    2. Alejandra Mizala & Pablo González & Pilar Romaguera & Andrea Guzman, 2000. "Los maestros en Chile: Carreras e Incentivos," Research Department Publications 3102, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    3. Mizala, Alejandra & Romaguera, Pilar, 2003. "El Sistema Nacional de Evaluación del Desempeño Docente (SNED) en Chile," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 2397, Inter-American Development Bank.

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