Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Comparing Organizational Structures in Health Services

Contents:

Author Info

  • Jelovac, I.
  • Macho-Stadler, I.

Abstract

The study of organizational choice is crucial to the understanding of firms' efficiency. We consider this issue applied to contracts on health services. In particular, we analyze the circumstances under which it is better for an insurer to contract with both the hospital and the physician instead of contracting exclusively with the hospital, delegating to the latter the power to contract the physician.

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 412.98.

as in new window
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:412.98

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 08193, Bellaterra, Barcelona
Phone: 34 93 592 1203
Fax: +34 93 542-1223
Email:
Web page: http://pareto.uab.cat
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: MORAL HAZARD ; HEALTH SERVICES;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Joseph P. Newhouse, 1992. "Medical Care Costs: How Much Welfare Loss?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 3-21, Summer.
  2. Macho-Stadler, I. & Perez-Castrillo, J.D., 1990. "Double risque moral et délégation," DELTA Working Papers 90-21, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  3. Perez-Castrillo, J.D. & Macho-Stadler, I., 1992. "Centralized and Decentralized Contracts in a Moral Hazad Environment," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 179.92, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  4. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 70, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Nahum D. Melumad & Dilip Mookherjee & Stefan Reichelstein, 1995. "Hierarchical Decentralization of Incentive Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 654-672, Winter.
  6. Robinson, James C, 1996. "Administered Pricing and Vertical Integration in the Hospital Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 357-78, April.
  7. Michel Poitevin, 2000. "Can the theory of incentives explain decentralization?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 33(4), pages 878-906, November.
  8. Brooks, John M. & Dor, Avi & Wong, Herbert S., 1997. "Hospital-insurer bargaining: An empirical investigation of appendectomy pricing," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 417-434, August.
  9. Nahum Melumad & Dilip Mookherjee & Stefan Reichelstein, 1997. "Contract Complexity, Incentives, and the Value of Delegation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 257-289, 06.
  10. Gaynor, Martin, 1994. "Issues in the Industrial Organization of the Market for Physician Services," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 211-55, Spring.
  11. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
  12. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 1998. "Decentralization and Collusion," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1210, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  13. Izabela Jelovac, 2001. "Physicians' payment contracts, treatment decisions and diagnosis accuracy," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(1), pages 9-25.
  14. Ching-to Albert Ma, 1994. "Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme 0047, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  15. Randall P. Ellis & Thomas G. McGuire, 1993. "Supply-Side and Demand-Side Cost Sharing in Health Care," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 135-151, Fall.
  16. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1998. "Collusion and Delegation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(2), pages 280-305, Summer.
  17. POITEVIN, Michel, 2000. "Innis Lecture: Can the Theory of Incentives Explain Decentralization?," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques 2000-13, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Theilen, Bernd, 1965-, 2011. "Decentralization of contracts with interim sidecontracting," Working Papers 2072/169684, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  2. Rafael Hortala-Vallve & Miguel Sanchez, 2005. "Hierarchic contracting," STICERD - Distributional Analysis Research Programme Papers, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE 73, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  3. Carroll, Kathleen & Ruseski, Jane, 2009. "Modeling Internal Decision Making Process: An Explanation of Conflicting Empirical Results on Behavior of Nonprofit and For-Profit Hospitals," Working Papers 2009-23, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
  4. Brekke, Kurt Richard & Levaggi, Rosella & Siciliani, Luigi & Straume, Odd Rune, 2011. "Patient Mobility, Health Care Quality and Welfare," CEPR Discussion Papers 8559, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Theilen Bernd, 2008. "Lobbying and Contract Delegation in Public Procurement," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-35, September.
  6. Siciliani, Luigi, 2006. "Selection of treatment under prospective payment systems in the hospital sector," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 479-499, May.
  7. Theilen, Bernd, 2009. "Decentralization and the Gains from Monitoring," Working Papers 2072/42863, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  8. Barlo, Mehmet & Ayca, Ozdogan, 2012. "Team beats collusion," MPRA Paper 37449, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Pedro Pita Barros & Xavier Martinez-Giralt, 2006. "Contractual design and public-private parternships for hospitals," Working Papers 292, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  10. Mehmet Barlo & Ayça Özdoğan, 2013. "The Optimality of Team Contracts," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(4), pages 670-689, November.
  11. Miguel A. Sanchez & Rafael Hortala-Vallve, 2005. "Hierarchic contracting," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 6548, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  12. Pedro Barros & Xavier Martinez-Giralt, 2009. "Contractual design and PPPs for hospitals: lessons for the Portuguese model," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 437-453, October.
  13. Kuhn, Michael & Siciliani, Luigi, 2013. "Manipulation and auditing of public sector contracts," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 251-267.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:412.98. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Xavier Vila).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.