Learning in economics: the Austrian insights
AbstractIn this contribution I first present a selective review of the literature on learning theories in economics. I then show that those theories are often assimilating knowledge to information or considering knowledge as a structure of information. Finally I discuss the possibility for those theories to be defined as Austrian and I conclude with a presentation of a research agenda.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ICER - International Centre for Economic Research in its series ICER Working Papers with number 25-2001.
Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2001
Date of revision:
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