Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Sluggish exit and entry of labour and capital, stability and effects of taxes and subsidies in models of fisheries

Contents:

Author Info

  • Asgeir Danielsson
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    It is assumed that exit and entry of fishermen, as well as vessels, is not instantaneous. The wage rate varies with the fortunes of the fishing firms and affects the endogenous labour supply creating a second transmission mechanism from profits to effort. There are realistic cases where this mechanism has important effects on the stability of the dynamic system and on the effects of taxes (subsisdies) on the size of the fish stock. If labour supply depends negatively on the wage rate, the immediate effect of an increase in the tax rate is to increase effort and harvest. In some cases the increase in the tax rate increases overexploitation also in the long term. This outcome is highly probable if the dynamic system is unstable.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.sedlabanki.is/uploads/files/WP-22.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Department of Economics, Central bank of Iceland in its series Economics with number wp22_asgeir.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: Jan 2004
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ice:wpaper:wp22_asgeir

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Kalkofnsvegi 1, 150 Reykjavik
    Phone: 569-9600
    Fax: 569-9605
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.sedlabanki.is/
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords:

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Blanchflower, David G & Oswald, Andrew J & Sanfey, Peter, 1996. "Wages, Profits, and Rent-Sharing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 227-51, February.
    2. Dixon, Huw, 1987. "A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition with Walrasian Features," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(1), pages 134-60, March.
    3. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 124.
    4. Trond Bjorndal & Jon M. Conrad, 1987. "The Dynamics of an Open Access Fishery," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 20(1), pages 74-85, February.
    5. Weitzman, Martin L., 2002. "Landing Fees vs Harvest Quotas with Uncertain Fish Stocks," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 325-338, March.
    6. Wilen, James E., 2000. "Renewable Resource Economists and Policy: What Differences Have We Made?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 306-327, May.
    7. Smith, Vernon L, 1969. "On Models of Commercial Fishing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 77(2), pages 181-98, March/Apr.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ice:wpaper:wp22_asgeir. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Central Bank of Iceland).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.