Inequality and Cost of Electoral Campaigns in Latin America
AbstractThis article explores theoretic and empirically the effects of inequality on the cost of electoral campaigns. An electoral competition model suggests that electoral campaigns costs increase with the level of inequality. That result stresses the need of careful campaign financing regulation in highlyunequal Latin America. An econometric analysis of Brazilian 2002 and 2004 elections at the state and municipal levels confirms that result, especially for the municipal elections. Moreover, according to the empirical results, the lower the age dispersion and the higher the education dispersion of voters, the more expensive are the electoral campaigns.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa in its series Insper Working Papers with number wpe_152.
Date of creation: Oct 2008
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Maurício Bugarin & Adriana Portugal & Sérgio Sakurai, 2008. "Inequality and Cost of Electoral Campaigns in Latin America," Working Papers 08_14, Universidade de São Paulo, Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade de Ribeirão Preto.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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- John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
- Portugal, Adriana C. & Bugarin, Maurício, 2007. "Electoral Campaign Financing: The role of public contributions and party ideology," Insper Working Papers wpe_102, Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa.
- Adriana Cuocco Portuga & Mauricio Bugarin, 2007. "Electoral Campaign Financing: The Role of Public Contributions and Party Ideology," JOURNAL OF LACEA ECONOMIA, LACEA - LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION.
- Roemer John E, 2006. "Party Competition under Private and Public Financing: A Comparison of Institutions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-31, April.
- Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135.
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