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Electoral Campaign Financing: The Role of Public Contributions and Party Ideology

Author

Listed:
  • Adriana Cuocco Portuga
  • Mauricio Bugarin

Abstract

This article analyzes the effects of public financing of electoral campaigns on policies announced by ideologically oriented parties, subject to pre-electoral lobbying. Parties´ ideologies make politicians announce divergent platforms, even though it means losing some votes. Divergent platforms, in turn, make lobbies actually contribute to parties´ electoral campaigns. The announced platforms are biased in favor of the parties´ ideology and interest groups´ preferred policies. Finally, increasing public financing of electoral campaigns may generate unequal electoral competition and may significantly raise the chances of one party becoming hegemonic, wiping out party competition in the long run.

Suggested Citation

  • Adriana Cuocco Portuga & Mauricio Bugarin, 2007. "Electoral Campaign Financing: The Role of Public Contributions and Party Ideology," Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Fall 2007), pages 143-177, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000425:008635
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    Cited by:

    1. Maurício Bugarin & Adriana Portugal & Sérgio Sakurai, 2008. "Inequality and Cost of Electoral Campaigns in Latin America," Working Papers 08_14, Universidade de São Paulo, Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade de Ribeirão Preto.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public campaign financing; private political contributions; party ideology; electoral competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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